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INTRODUCTION 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”)1 was, ostensibly, a response to the crisis in the U.S. hous-
ing market and the inter-related crisis in the market for mortgage-backed 
securities (“MBS”).  One of the goals of the legislation, presumably, was to 
prevent another crisis in housing and mortgage finance.  After what we 
have seen in recent years, certainly no one could question the importance of 
that goal.  The housing crisis has deprived thousands upon thousands of 
Americans of not just wealth, but of their homes; it has helped drive muni-
cipalities to the brink of fiscal collapse; and it has impeded the recovery of 
the U.S. job market.  The MBS crisis took down major financial institutions 
in the United States and almost caused a complete collapse of the financial 
sector.  We cannot afford a repeat experience. 
But Dodd-Frank, even if it is implemented in the far-reaching way that 
some hope and think it can be, will not address a problem at the heart of the 
housing and MBS crisis: excessive complexity.  The years running up to 
 
* Northwestern University School of Law.  Associate Dean of Academic Affairs: Faculty 
and Research, and Stanford Clinton Sr. & Zylpha Kilbride Clinton Research Professor of 
Law. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
DANA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:16 PM 
722 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
the implosion of the housing and MBS markets were marked by ever-
increasing complexity.  This complexity caused confusion and poor judg-
ments on the part of unsophisticated home buyers and owners, as well as 
supposedly sophisticated securities investors.2  This complexity also al-
lowed some people and institutions to make an astonishing amount of mon-
ey originating mortgages that never should have been originated and selling 
MBS that never should have been sold, at least at the prices at which they 
were sold.3  Dodd-Frank does not do the structural simplification work we 
need to prevent this from recurring once the memories of the current crisis 
fade. 
Instead of Dodd-Frank, we need clear statutory reform that limits resi-
dential mortgages to a few sensible products, all girded by strict underwrit-
ing standards, and that correspondingly produces a well-ordered, transpa-
rent market in bonds or securities based on these mortgages.  Other 
countries, most notably Denmark, have maintained a simplified, and hence 
much more stable, regime of residential lending and finance with reasona-
ble costs of capital for borrowers.  Moreover, it would probably be a good 
thing if reforms brought about lower rates of household investments in 
home ownership in the United States.  From a basic economics perspective, 
Americans have long been overinvested in where they live.  The approach I 
advocate—the simplicity approach, if you will—is admittedly politically 
unfeasible at present, but if what is politically feasible is only Dodd-Frank, 
then perhaps our attention needs to focus most immediately on changing 
our politics and thereby expanding the domain of the politically feasible. 
I.  THE MOVE TO COMPLEXITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
At one point in time, residential lending in the United States was fairly 
simple, involving few parties per transaction and few instruments.  Thirty-
year fixed rate, fully-amortized mortgages were overwhelmingly the mort-
gage of choice, a significant down payment deposit was required, and 
second and third mortgages were relatively uncommon, at least as part of 
the initial purchase transaction.  In the last twenty years or so, we saw the 
utilization of a dizzying array of nontraditional alternatives in which rates 
were not fixed or were only fixed for a time, principal was only partially 
amortized or not amortized at all, and by means of second mortgages or 
 
 2. See SIEGEL & GALE, SIEGEL & GALE SIMPLICITY SURVEY: A CLARION CALL FOR 
TRANSPARENCY 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.siegelgale.com/pdf/S+G_Simplicity_ 
Survey.pdf. 
 3. See MARTIN NEIL BAILY ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 22 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/11_ 
origins_crisis_baily_litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf. 
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simply through relaxed underwriting standards, purchases often meant little 
or no upfront, unborrowed cash deposit.4  At the same time, the number of 
parties involved in a single loan proliferated.5  Whereas once mortgages 
were solicited, originated, and held by lenders,6 now those functions are 
typically performed by different parties.  Mortgage brokers often originate 
mortgages, and usually sell them as fast as possible to lenders, who in turn 
often sell them again and again.  Lenders very often retain servicing on 
loans they sold long ago.7  As the big servicers, such as Bank of America, 
have recently been forced to admit,8 the fabric of transactions surrounding 
a given ordinary residential mortgage can now be so complex that it is no 
mean feat to determine at a given point in time who exactly “owns” the 
mortgage.9 
There has been a corresponding move to complexity in the MBS arena.10  
Mortgages have been securitized for quite a long time in the United 
States,11 but until recently, almost all of the securitized mortgages were 
fixed rate mortgages that were originated using relatively strict Federal 
 
 4. See ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N AM., EXOTIC OR 
TOXIC? AN EXAMINATION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND 
LENDERS 3-4 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_ 
Mortgage_Report0506.pdf. 
 5. See David A. Dana, A Simple Approach to Preventing the Next Housing Crisis: Why 
We Need One, What One Would Look Like, and Why Dodd-Frank Isn’t It, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 31, 2010, 4:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-a-dana/a-simple-
approach-to-prev_b_803092.html [hereinafter Dana, A Simple Approach]; see also David A. 
Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation Principle in State Property Law, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 102-05 (2010) [hereinafter Dana, Foreclosure Crisis]. 
 6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 58.02(11) (2006). 
 7. For an excellent source on the transformation of the housing industry in the United 
States and its implications for the foreclosure crisis, see CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION (2009), available at http://cop.senate. 
gov/documents/cop-030609-report.pdf. See also Dana, Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 5, at 
97. 
 8. See William Arden, Bank of America Stops Foreclosures in All Fifty States, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/08/bank-of 
-america-halts-foreclosures_n_755737.html. 
 9. That is at least part of the difficulty of establishing whether foreclosures are proper. 
See id.  For an extended discussion of the possible implications of the difficulties of ascer-
taining legal ownership of mortgages and MBS, see CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 
AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION (2010), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-11 
1610-report.pdf. 
 10. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market 
for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 465 (2009). 
 11. See Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 10 A.3d 236, 243 (N.J. Super. 2010); Chris-
topher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007); Fred 
N. Sauer, Seeds of Financial Catastrophe, AMERICAN THINKER (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www. 
americanthinker.com/2010/12/seeds_of_financial_catastrophe.html. 
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Housing Administration (FHA) or Freddie Mac underwriting requirements 
and that enjoyed an implicit repayment guarantee of the United States.12  In 
the years immediately leading up to the implosion of the housing and mort-
gage finance market, we witnessed an array of new private label MBS that 
were much more complex than traditional MBS.  The new types of MBS 
had so many tranches and permutations that you needed flow charts and 
advanced engineering degrees just to map them out.  FHA and Freddie Mac 
sought to compete with private label MBS by loosening their underwriting 
standards and producing increasingly varied MBS products.13  The greater 
complexity in the market for mortgage instruments and in the MBS market 
were intertwined and reinforcing.  As Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter 
have recently detailed: “The greater and more complex array of MBS fed 
demand for more borrowers, which was achieved in part by means of new, 
more complex loan arrangements that targeted households that could not 
have afforded traditional mortgages.”14 
That the housing and MBS crises were preceded by a move from sim-
plicity to great complexity does not, by itself, mean that the complexity per 
se was a cause of the two crises.  But complexity can operate to lead to sub-
optimal decisions, as the behavioral psychology literature illustrates.  Faced 
with a confusing array of choices, people tend to fall back on heuristic bi-
ases that do not necessarily result in decisions that maximize their wel-
fare.15  In particular, the complexity of mortgage arrangements and instru-
ments likely made it easier for potential home owners and refinancing 
home owners to fall prey to the “myopia bias” and the “the optimism bi-
as.”16  The myopia bias leads to excessive discounting of future costs com-
pared to near-term or immediate ones.17  With the optimism bias, it was too 
 
 12. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble (U. Pa. 
Inst. for Law & Econ. Res., Research Paper No. 10-15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1669401; see also Dana, Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 5, at 102-03. 
 13. See Steven Malanga, ACORN: Creature of the CRA—How the Community Rein-
vestment Act Gave Rise to the Radical Activist Group, FRONTPAGEMAG (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=36330. 
 14. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 12, at 44. 
 15. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2005) (as-
serting that people nonetheless will gravitate to situations where they are offered more and 
more choices, which Schwartz refers to as “the paradox of choice”). 
 16. See Eric S. Belsky et al., Consumer and Mortgage Credit at the Crossroads, in 
BORROWING TO LIVE 5, 30-33 (Nicolas Retsinas & Eric Belsky eds., 2008) (discussing these 
biases in the mortgage lending context); A. Ross Otto & Bradley C. Love, You Don’t Want 
to Know What You’re Missing: When Information About Foregone Rewards Impeded Dy-
namic Decision Making, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 1, 1-10 (2010). 
 17. See HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., HIGH STAKES DECISION MAKING: NORMATIVE, 
DESCRIPTIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE CONSIDERATIONS 6 (2001), available at http://marketing. 
wharton.upenn.edu/ideas/pdf/Kahn/high%20stakes%20decision%20making.pdf. 
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easy for many borrowers to believe that housing prices always rise (and 
certainly never fall) and hence that a no-money down, variable-interest rate 
mortgage is not just immediately tempting but also prudent.18  So, too, the 
dizzying array of MBS choices made it easier for investors to heavily in-
vest funds that were supposed to be reserved for prudent investments, 
without directly tackling the possibility that the always-rising-prices scena-
rio might be nothing more than a historical anomaly. 
Swindlers flourished in the complexity and the confusion of the housing 
and MBS markets.  The complexity of consumer choice made it easier for 
unscrupulous mortgage originators to target and sell products to vulnerable 
homeowners and home buyers that they did not understand, could not af-
ford, did not need, or were more expensive than available alternatives.19  
The complexity of the MBS markets and its instruments allowed the origi-
nators, poolers, and sellers of MBS to take advantage of their superior in-
formation by overcharging and overselling their customers.20  Complexity 
made it easier for the MBS poolers and marketers to shop offerings among 
credit agencies for the best ratings.  Complexity helped the credit agencies 
to meet the implicit demands of the MBS poolers and marketers—and 
hence boost their profits—because it allowed them to tell themselves the 
story that the offerings, which after all were too complex for them to really 
understand, somehow might deserve the AAA or AA ratings.21 
Complexity has also made it harder for the government and private ac-
tors to respond sensibly to the housing and MBS crises.22  One plausible 
solution to the housing crisis would be the re-working of mortgages to re-
duce principal and make the mortgages more in keeping with actual market 
values.  There are many reasons we have observed almost no loan modifi-
cations with principal reductions, but one contributing factor is the division 
of individual mortgages into many distinct and often adverse investment 
interests and the consequent difficulty of gaining approval from mortgage 
 
 18. James Kwak, Housing in Ten Words, BASELINESCENARIO (Aug. 23, 2010, 10:04 
AM), http://baselinescenario.com/2010/08/23/housing-in-ten-words/. 
 19. As one of the most trenchant commentators on the housing crisis succinctly put it, 
“[t]he mess was caused by years of poisonous lending, regulatory inaction and outright 
fraud.” Gretchen Morgenson, Housing Doesn’t Need a Crash. It Needs Bold Ideas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at BU1. 
 20. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 12, at 50. 
 21. See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Ratings Agencies Shared Data and Wall 
Street Seized the Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1 (discussing documents show-
ing that the credit agencies understood that “they couldn’t properly analyze all of the banks’ 
products”). 
 22. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 12, at 6. 
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“owners” to significant modifications.23  The division of the ownership of 
mortgages from their servicing has also impeded loan modifications.24 
Finally, complexity helped vested economic interests—including those 
making money off the poor choices that home buyers and owners and se-
curities investors make in an environment of complexity—avoid effective 
regulatory oversight.  In the lead up to the implosion of the housing and 
MBS markets, federal regulators were largely passive, but when they did 
try to act, they received an enormous push-back from the financial industry 
and they quickly retreated.25  The financial industry’s enormous clout with 
both political parties in Congress as well as the White House would make it 
difficult for even the most courageous, well-intentioned regulators to try to 
get anything done that the industry does not favor.  But complexity makes 
it harder for such regulators to try to get anything done because regulators 
quite plausibly can be (and are) assaulted with the claim that they do not 
fully understand the complexities of the relevant markets and hence are not 
equipped to impose new rules and regulations.  Indeed, in the wake of the 
MBS crisis, regulators had to turn for advice and counsel to the same enti-
ties that had helped create and benefited from the bubble in MBS instru-
ments for explanations of those instruments and guidance as to what they 
might really be worth. 
II.  THE SIMPLICITY APPROACH (OR WHY NOT FOLLOW DENMARK?) 
In a simplified mortgage and MBS market, there would be only one or 
two kinds of residential mortgages available, with the thirty-year fixed-rate 
 
 23. See Dana, Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 5, at 104.  For an extended, thoughtful ac-
count of increasing fragmentation (without using the word as such) of property in our law in 
areas other than mortgages, see MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO 
MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008). 
 24. See Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2008-46, 2008), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200846/200846pap.pdf; Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics 
of Structured Finance 10-15 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-060, 2008), available 
at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-060.pdf; see also Why President Obama’s Plan Will 
Not Work and What Will: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of 
House Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 6-7 (2009) (testimony of John D. Geanakoplos, Pro-
fessor of Economics, Yale University), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/ 
financialsvcs_dem/geanakoplos_testimony_-_all.pdf (“Servicers are paid a percentage of 
principal for each house that is not defaulting.  That means reducing interest costs them 
nothing and gains them much, at least in the short term” and “all servicers are driven by 
their immediate needs.”); Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Con-
tracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1075, 1102-12 (2009). 
 25. See Susan P. Koniak, George M. Cohen, David A. Dana & Thomas Ross, How 
Washington Abetted the Bank Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at WK10. 
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as the predominant instrument; putting twenty percent down or paying 
mortgage insurance requirements would be strict requirements, not easily 
evaded using second mortgages; and rate disparities among mortgages of-
fered to borrowers would thus be limited.  The similarity in instruments and 
uniformity of underwriting standards would not support a wide range of 
rates.  Because only traditional, reasonable risk mortgages would be made, 
there would be no possibility of MBS based on nontraditional mortgages.  
MBS pools would be based on quite transparent instruments, and investors 
in MBS could thus make reasoned and reasonable investment choices.  In 
such an environment, the bubbles and subsequent implosions we expe-
rienced would be less likely. 
Moreover, there are models—and not just historical ones—for such a 
simplified regime of mortgage finance.  In Denmark, the form of residential 
mortgages is tightly regulated—so much so that there is really only a single 
mortgage rate good for virtually all new mortgages on any given day.  
Mortgages are financed with bonds, such that banks are able to off-load in-
terest rate risk while retaining creditworthiness risk.  The Danish system, 
which the prominent investor George Soros has suggested as a model for 
the United States, was adopted in the wake of late nineteenth century hous-
ing bubbles and has proved highly effective in preventing bubbles.26  At the 
same time, the cost of capital for mortgages in Denmark compares favora-
bly with the rest of Europe and the United States.27  If a simplified regime 
can satisfy the needs of home buyers and owners in Denmark while achiev-
ing admirable stability, why, at least in theory, can the United States not do 
the same? 
Dodd-Frank does not even come close to offering greater simplicity.  It 
is a massive piece of legislation.  The bill does not bar nontraditional mort-
gage instruments; it does not even require that potential home buyers be 
given a lucid explanation of how a plain vanilla mortgage would compare 
to less traditional, higher risk alternatives.  Regulations should at least re-
quire mortgage brokers to offer traditional mortgages to customers who can 
afford them, but even that modest reform seems unlikely given the clout of 
 
 26. See George Soros, Denmark Offers a Model Mortgage Market, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 
2008, at A15 (explaining that in Denmark “[m]ortgage originators are required to retain cre-
dit risk and to perform the servicing functions, thereby properly aligning the incentives”). 
 27. See id.; see also Karen Dubas, Summary, Can Elements of the Danish Mortgage 
System Fix Mortgage Securitization in the United States?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. 
POL’Y RES. (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.aei.org/EMStaticPage/100028?page=Summary (“In 
Denmark, the credit risk of a loan is required to remain with the brokers or mortgage bank-
ers who originated the debt.  Unlike the current U.S. model, Danish mortgage originators are 
now invested in the credit worthiness of the loan; their interests become ‘perpetually 
aligned’ with the borrowers, and they become de facto ‘liability advisers.’  The interest-rate 
risk in the loan is sold to bond holders.”). 
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the financial industry.  Moreover, it is hard to imagine that courts will 
uphold regulations that, in effect, re-insert provisions into Dodd-Frank that 
Congress quite plainly removed from it as part of the process that allowed 
for its ultimate passage and enactment into law.28  Congressional intent that 
Dodd-Frank be limp, lax, and not terribly protective of consumers is in no 
way admirable, but is quite plain for all to see. 
Dodd-Frank also does not restrict what kinds of mortgages can be secu-
ritized or how they can be securitized.  It is true that Dodd-Frank may make 
certain mortgages riskier than before for investors by giving borrowers who 
feel they were sold an unsuitable mortgage some recourse against foreclo-
sure.  But if recent history has taught us anything, it is that investors in 
MBS sometimes can be sold on securities based on mortgages that are in 
fact quite risky—indeed, that in a search for a higher rate of return, they 
may gravitate to such investments whether they understand what they are 
doing or not.  We can be assured that the financial industry will seek to tap 
the ever-present yearning for higher return. 
III.  THE CHOICE-IS-ALWAYS-GOOD/INNOVATION-IS-ALWAYS-GOOD 
OBJECTION 
One central objection to a simple regime of mortgage finance is that 
complexity is beneficial when it gives consumers (home buyers, owners, 
and investors) greater choice and thus allows them to maximize their prefe-
rences.  After all, if choice is good, isn’t more choice better? And if innova-
tion is good, why isn’t financial innovation in mortgages and MBS good, 
too? Even after the recent crises, it is still commonplace for politicians, 
business leaders, and elite commentators to opine that financial innovation 
is a key American comparative advantage that we must not undermine in 
the interest of reform.29 
As noted above, however, more choice does not always translate into 
better informed, better-reasoned choice.  Moreover, even if one (unrealisti-
cally) assumed that people do always maximize their own narrowly-
 
 28. But see Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets 
for Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681 (2011).  Some judges or justices who are ideo-
logically predisposed toward financial regulation, or that hold a principled stance in favor of 
judicial deference to the executive branch, might uphold implementing regulations that call 
for specific consumer protections Congress considered, but omitted, from the final financial 
reform legislation.  But I am doubtful that many—and certainly not most—of the relevant 
judges or justices fall into those categories. 
 29. See, e.g., Felix Salmon, Obama Likes Financial Innovation, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 
2009, 12:13 EDT) (reporting on a speech by President Obama in which he said he “wants to 
do regulatory reform ‘in a way that doesn’t stifle innovation’”), http://blogs.reuters.com/ 
felix-salmon/2009/09/14/obama-likes-financial-innovation/. 
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understood welfare through more choice, the fact is that many people are 
affected by other peoples’ choices that impact the stability of the housing 
market.  Children who lose their family home because a parent entered into 
an imprudent mortgage, neighbors whose housing values plummet and ba-
sic services disappear because of foreclosures, and retirees whose pensions 
go underfunded because the pension fund invested in overvalued MBS all 
lose out as a result of other peoples’ choices. 
 Perhaps in part because housing is a domain where such externali-
ties abound, there is, in fact, a long tradition of constraining individual 
choice and requiring the use of certain standardized forms in the area of 
real property law generally, and in the context of mortgages in particular.  
What makes a mortgage a mortgage rather than an installment land con-
tract, legally, is that mandatory rights and obligations are read into the 
agreement between borrower and lender, whatever the parties contractually 
intended.30  Viewed in the broader swath of Anglo-American legal history, 
the essence of mortgage law is legal constraint on ad hoc innovation, in the 
interest of preserving social stability and protecting the vulnerable. 
Indeed, as Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have asserted, what argua-
bly distinguishes the domain of property law from that of contract law is 
that property law insists upon a high degree of standardization and, in that 
sense, simplification.31  Smith and Merrill root property’s traditional de-
mand of standardization in the benefits of reducing transaction costs for 
third parties to property transactions, but the recent housing and MBS cris-
es suggest that this tradition can also be defended as a means of protecting 
parties to property transactions from the cognitive pitfalls of complexity 
and underhandedness of those who would take advantage of those pitfalls 
(and from the resulting social costs in the form of lost homes and stressed 
communities).  The recent crisis also underscores the wisdom of the tradi-
tion in property of constraining and overriding private party choice in the 
interest of preventing or overcoming excessive fragmentation of interests in 
real property. 
IV.  THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY OBJECTION 
If mortgages and MBS were standardized and simplified, the average 
costs of borrowed money for purchase money mortgages might not climb 
but it is certainly possible that both some buyers would not be able to buy 
 
 30. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Vagueness and the Rule of Law: Reconsidering Installment 
Land Contract Forfeitures, 1988 DUKE L.J. 609 (exploring the boundary line between the 
mortgage and the installment land contract). 
 31. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 68-70 (2000). 
DANA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:16 PM 
730 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
as expensive a home as they otherwise would have; and, some buyers with 
poor credit histories or limited income and assets would be unable to buy a 
home at all.  With respect to the first possibility, I think the best response 
is, why would that be a bad thing?  Until very recently, the average size of 
new U.S. homes has steadily increased as the size of the households occu-
pying them has declined, or at most remained steady.32  The result is more 
sprawl, fossil fuels consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions, and not 
necessarily more happiness, at least as far as anyone can objectively meas-
ure happiness.  Moreover, households that have invested heavily in homes 
are not acting in accord with standard portfolio theory, which teaches that 
the best way to temper financial risks is to diversify one’s investments.33  
From this perspective, many households that sank all their available capital 
and committed all their anticipated earnings in a single asset—a house—
would have been much better off diversifying by buying less house AND 
investing more in their human capital (e.g., education) or other, more liquid 
forms of capital (e.g., bonds, stocks, life insurance). 
But what about people who, under a regime of only traditional mortgage 
instruments and straightforward, reasonably strict underwriting, would be 
left out of the housing-ownership market altogether?  The ownership-
society school of social policy and popular commentary teaches that by 
owning homes, people achieve greater personal and familial success, com-
munities become more stable, and social ills are reduced.34  If ownership 
equals greater individual and social welfare, is not anything that reduces 
that rate of ownership a bad thing? 
Recent scholarship calls into question the necessary connection between 
ownership, and stability and human flourishing.35  But even if we accept 
that connection, the fact is that owning a fee simple is not the only way to 
gain the emotional attachment and longer-term perspective that we believe 
is the mechanism by which “ownership” confers individual and social ben-
 
 32. The average U.S. house increased in size from 1400 square feet in 1970 to 2521 
square feet in 2007. See Home Size Continues to Decline; Buyers Increasingly Opt for Sin-
gle-Story Homes, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS (June 14, 2010), http://www.nahb.org/ 
news_details.aspx?newsID=10898. 
 33. See generally HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFI-
CATION OF INVESTMENTS 1 (1959) (“A good portfolio is more than a long list of good stocks 
and bonds.  It is a balanced whole, providing the investor with protections and opportunities 
with respect to a wide range of contingencies.”). 
 34. Support for low-income home ownership has crossed political lines, but the owner-
ship society idea itself has conservative political roots. See Naomi Klein, Disowned by the 
Ownership Society, NATION (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/disowned-
ownership-society. 
 35. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of 
Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1109-10 (2009). 
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efits.  In the United States, there are relatively few protections for residen-
tial renters from displacement by landlords, government action, or market 
forces.  Most available leases are one-year or month-to-month, and there 
are very few protections in more than a handful of locations against lan-
dlord’s decisions not to renew leases or to drastically increase rent at the 
time of lease renewal.  If the menu of rental arrangements available to low-
income households included ones that offered more of the stability that 
(sometimes) is offered by a fee simple, while costing less than a fee simple 
and thus being genuinely affordable to these households, many of the bene-
fits of the ownership society could be achieved.36  Providing people with 
greater ownership in their places of employment and in their local schools 
could also go a long way to achieving the benefits of an ownership society. 
V.  THE HARD REALITY OF POLITICS AND THE NEED FOR CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM 
So what is to be done? If Dodd-Frank gets us (almost) nowhere and 
something more radical and much more simple is needed, how can that be 
achieved?  The answer is that simplified legislation will only come from 
new Executive leadership or new legislation, and there is no reason, under 
the current politics, to anticipate either.37  Thus, the only “solution” is a ter-
ribly hard one: to change the politics.  But, as many commentators have 
noted, both political parties appear aligned with, if not captive to, the inter-
ests of the financial industry and the apparent goal of that industry to essen-
tially continue functioning as if the housing and MBS crises never hap-
pened.  This alignment, at least in part, reflects the reality of the huge 
financial contributions that that industry makes and, after Citizens United v. 
FEC,38 will be freer to make than ever before.  What that means is that new 
legislation is needed to reform campaign finance and pressure the Supreme 
Court to temper its First Amendment absolutism when the interests of large 
corporations are at issue.  Hence the catch and the challenge: we need (at a 
minimum) new rules for campaign finance to get better politics, but until 
we get better politics, we cannot get the new rules.  So, somehow, we need 
 
 36. A broader menu of rental alternatives might well develop if some of the explicit and 
implicit subsidies for home ownership were eliminated. Cf. R.S. Radford, Regulatory Tak-
ings in the 1990’s: The Death of Rent Control?, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1019, 1109-20 (1992) 
(discussing the role of implicit subsidies in driving up rental rates).  To my knowledge, no 
one has adequately explained why there is such a drastic bifurcation in U.S. residential 
housing between short-term leases and fee simples. 
 37. See How Republicans May Change Dodd-Frank After Elections, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 
2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39537984/How_Republicans_May_Change_Dodd_Frank_ 
After_Elections. 
 38. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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to achieve meaningful, constructive political change even under rules that 
have led to dominance by two parties that cannot (or will not) undertake the 
reforms that are needed for our public welfare.  It is a hard challenge, but 
our politics have overcome even harder challenges—the Great Depression, 
World War II, Jim Crow—and prevailed.  It is time to do that again. 
